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TOWARD A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THIRD WORLD LEGAL ISSUES 
Robert A. Williams, Jr. * 
James Henderson ** 
Western liberal thoughtl has consistently failed to 
provide a coherent theory of rights for the Third World in 
legal discourse. 2 If to name a thing is to be its master, 
how revealing that Western global newspeak has labeled (and 
thereby implicitly prioritized) the complex matrix of social, 
economic and political crises confronting minority groups, 
indigenous cultures and underindustrialized nations as 
"third world problems." The label's cavalier nebulousness 
serves to legitimate inaction while denying the immediacy of 
the need. 3 
* Robert A. Williams, Jr. is an Assistant Professor of Law at Rutgers 
Law School in Camden, New Jersey. 
** James Henderson is a May, 1982 candidate for the degree of Juris 
Doctor at Boston College Law School in Newton, Massachusetts. 
We thank Professors Berney and Howe of Boston College Law School for 
their thoughts and suggestions during the times when this paper was 
little more than an idea. We also thank Roger Hertz of the Third World 
Law Journal staff for his research on the law of the sea controversey. 
1For a discussion on liberalism and liberal thought, see generally, 
G. Frug, "The City As a Legal Concept," 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) 
(hereinafter cited as Frug). 
20n liberalism's failure to articulate a coherent theory of rights 
against the state, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975). 
3For a discussion on naming and symbolizing, see R. BARTHES THE 
EIFFEL TOWER AND OTHER MYTHOLOGIES (1979) (hereinafter cited as BARTHES). 
On page 55, Mr. Barthes writes: 
1 
within recent decades, this self-serving stance of 
Western liberal thought has been challenged by the non-
occidental nations and cultures of the world. This chal-
lenge has led to a critical re-examination of the structure 
and outcomes of liberal legal and political theory. But the 
attack has been only partial. It has been constrained by 
the unavailability of effective and suitable forums, many of 
which were controlled by the mE;!mbers of the IIFirst and 
Second worlds. 4 What is needed is a total reconstruction of 
liberal ideology's approach to the problems of the Third 
World. Such an approach would allow third world indivi-
duals, groups and nations to meaningfully assert their own 
vision and theory of the facts and values which should 
inform and shape the domestic and multinational legal pro-
cesses by which the rights of the fortunate wealthy and the 
struggling poor of this globe are justly determined. 
(footnote 3 continued) 
[Glood sense consists in establishing a simple equivalence 
between what is seen and what is. When an appearance is 
decidedly too peculiar, this same common sense still has a 
means of reducing it without .relinquishing the mechanism of 
equalities. This means is symbolism. Each time that some-
thing seen appears unmotivated, good sense calls in the heavy 
cavalry of the symbol, admitted to the petit-bourgeois heaven, 
insofar as, despite its abstract tendency, it unites the 
visible and the invisible in the form of a quantitative equal-
ity (this is worth that); calculation is saved, and the world 
still abides. --
And see P. Gable and J. Feinman, "Contract Law As Ideology," (an as 
yet unpublished anthology of critical essays. on law, D . Kairys , ed. 
1982), on denial and legitimation. 
4The "First World" refers to the industrialized· nations of the West and 
Japan. The "Second World" refers to the Soviet Union and other coun-
tries within the Communist bloc. Again, Barthes' comment (see BARTHES, 
supra note 3) is certainly appropos, even here. 
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This article is an attempt to begin constructing such 
an approach. It inquires into the content and interconnec-
tion of conflicting rhetorical modes found in the tradition-
al liberal stance on solutions to (or proposals for) social, 
economic, and political problems. confronted by third world 
peoples and cultures. It examines the underlying ideologi-
cal, political and philosophical presuppositions within 
liberal discourse on a few S'elected topics involving the 
rights of third world groups. This examination opens up to 
us the possibilities of constructing a broader conceptual 
framework, one capable of identifying legal and political 
solutions which legitimate oppression and alienation and one 
which would not deny the unjust relations existing presently 
between third world peoples and nations and the industrial-
ized nations. The methodology used to reveal the content 
and interconnection found within the traditional liberal 
stance is that developed by Professor Duncan Kennedy of 
Harvard Law school.. Professor Kennedy, in two law review 
articles,S has attempted to construct a critical legal 
framework for addressing the content of ideas which make up 
modern law. Kennedy argues that all legal issues can be 
reduced to a "single dilemma of the degree of collective as 
opposed to individual self-determination that is appropri-
5See D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance In Private Law Adjudication," 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (hereinafter cited as "Form and Substance"), 
and "The Structure of Blackstone's COlIDDentaries," 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 
(1979) (hereinafter cited as "The Structure of Blackstone'sCommen-
taries"). 
3 
ate ... 6 
Professor Kennedy's model enables us to examine the 
deeper levels of contradiction, which he demonstrates are 
everpresent in modern legal thought. Inevi tably, "we are 
di vided among . and within ourselves, between irrecon-
cilable visions of humanity and society, and between radi-
cally different aspirations for our common future"? whenever 
we critically examine any complex legal issue. Critical 
legal theory has been adopted by other writers8 for varying 
problems. 9 As of yet no writer has attempted to apply the 
model to third world legal issues. This paper will attempt 
to apply the critical model advanced by Kennedy and deter-
mine its pedagogical value for grappling with the complex 
economic, political and social problems confronted by the 
Third World. 
The paper will not single out for any overintensi ve 
examination one single issue confronting the Third World in 
this country or abroad. 10 Rather, its purpose is to present 
6"The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries," supra note 5, at 213. 
7 
"Form and Substance," supra note 5, at 1685. 
8 See, e.g., Frug, supra note 1, and M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION of 
AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HORWITZ]. 
9Frug reviewed the concept of the American city within the liberalist 
framework. Horwitz analyzed certain developments in American property 
law utilizing the critical framework. 
10For a discussion on the Third World, see generally, W. Langley, 
"The Third World: Towards A Definition," 2 B.C. THIRD WORLD 1. J. 1 
(1981), the Fall '81 Registration issue of the Harvard University Inde-
pendent (the Director of the University's Third World Center said: "The 
whole notion of the 'third world' is vague. In some people's minds it 
4 
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a general critical framework for analyzing in a broad manner 
many seemingly diffuse and unrelated legal issues from 
wi thin the liberal stance. I nevi tably , such an endeavor 
must be incomplete and tentati ve . Even so, the need for 
exploration of new forums and modes of understanding for 
grappling with the challenges posed by the Third World both 
domestically and internationally, is immediate. Caution, 
and our desire for the security of the pristine vision must 
now yield to the i1llI!lediacy of a billion exhortations to 
action. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. section I will 
draw from Professor Kennedy's two law review articles, "Form 
(footnote 10 continued) 
often boils down to the powerless colored against the powerful whites.") 
and the following definition: 
The concept "Third World" includes a geo-political dimension: 
those nations of the world, especially in Africa and Asia and 
Latin America, who share, in'many cases, a common history as 
eolonial depedendents of the major European powers. 
It also includes a psychological dimension: oppressed people 
generally, who have come to identify with the struggles of the 
former colonized nations and see the anti-colonial struggles 
as organically linked with their own attempts to obtain im-
provements in their conditions. 
Finally, the concept "Third World" includes a "Programmatic" 
dimension: those people in the above two groups who identify 
with the general concepts of economic and social progress, 
that this Journal has characterized here as the New Interna-
tional Economic Order and related concepts. 
Comment, Toward A Definition of the Term Third World, 1 B.C. Third World 
L. J. I, 13-35 (1981). 
For examples of third world legal issues, see Comments, "Indian's 
Regulation of Direct Foreign Investment: Article 29 of the 1973 Foreign 
Exchange Reg1,llation Act;" "The Federal Communications Commission's 
Approach to Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities;" and "An Intro-
duction to Tax Incentive To Investment In The People's Republic of 
I China," 2 B.C. Third World L.J. at 65-154. 
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and Substance" and liThe structure of Blackstone's Commen-
taries," in order to elaborate on his liberalist construct. 
Sections II, III, and IV will utilize the Kennedy liberalist 
construct in order to frame the central issues in a few 
representative on-going controversies within third world 
law. 
section I I focuses on the law of the sea controversy 
and the questions over production limitation in deep-sea 
mining. Section III considers the issue of resource control 
and development by indigenous Indian nations in the western 
hemisphere in general, and the United states in particular. 
Section IV reviews the controversy wi thin landlord-tenant 
law in America over the use of the implied warranty of 
habi tabili ty as a means of guaranteeing safe and decent 
apartment rentals to America's urban minorities. section V 
is a conclusion. It attempts to begin tpe construction of a 
conceptual framework for analyzing third world legal issues. 
Section I 
The Kennedy Liberalist Construct 
In "Form and Substance II and liThe structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries," Professor Kennedy posits a jurispru-
dential "angle of vision" ll which attempts to bring some 
11professor Kennedy would prefer - that the ideas emerging from "Form 
and Substance" and "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries" not be 
viewed as a cohesive jurisprudential theory. Instead, he prefers to 
view these ideas as "an opened-textured angle of vision" for understand-
ing various legal results. Telephone Interview with Professor Duncan 
Kennedy, Harvard Law School, October 17, 1981. 
6 
measure of order to the chaotic mass of "policies" lawyers 
use in justifying particular legal results. In "Form and 
Substance," he suggests that there are two opposed modes for 
dealing with "questions of form" in which legal solutions to 
substantive problems are cast: equitable standards or gene-
ral rules. Equitable standards allow a court to respond to 
a private law dispute in a flexible manner. Court rulings 
which are based on standards are usually ad hoc in nature 
and are of relatively little precedential value. 12 General 
rules are more rigid in definition and in application. They 
tend to be clearly defined and highly aaministrable; however, 
they do not allow the court the same flexibility as equi t-
able standards. 13 
There are at least three dimensions of both general 
rules and equitable standards. 
general rules are as follows: 
"generality"; and "formality".14 
The three dimensions of 
"formal realizability"; 
"Formal realizability" 
refers to the degree to which a legal directi ve has the 
quali ty of ruleness. A formally realizable rule leads to 
greater certainty (i.e., more predictable results) and 
places a restraint on the judge I s arbitrariness. 15 The 
generali ty aspect of rules allows the frame:::: of the legal 
directive to kill many birds with one stone. This minimizes 
12"Form and Substance," supra note 5, at 1685. 
13Id . 
14Id . at 1687-94. 
15Id . at 1687-89. 
7 
judicial discretion in choosing between conflicting lines of 
authority. 16 
The formality aspect of rules goes to the question of 
the role of the judiciary in society. Professor Kennedy 
argues: 
There is a third dimension for the description of legal 
directives that is as important as formal realizability and 
generality. In this dimension, we place at one pole legal 
institutions whose purpose is to prevent people from engag-
ing in particular activities because those activities are 
morally wrong or otherwise flatly undesirable. Most of the. 
law of crimes fits this pattern: Laws against murder aim to 
eliminate ~urder. At the other pole are legal institutions 
whose stated object is to facilitate private ordering. 
Legal institutions at this pole, sometimes called formali-
ties, are supposed to help parties in communicating clearly 
to the judge which of various alternatives they want him to 
follow in dealing with disput~s that may arise later in 
their17elationship. The law of conveyancing is the paradigm 
here. 
The three dimensions of equitable standards are as 
follows: "principles or policies"; "particularity"; and 
"regulation" (or rules designed to deter wrongful behavior). 
Professor Kennedy draws from contract law to give us exam-
ples of principles or policies: e.g., good faith, due care, 
fairness, unconscionability and unjust enrichment. 18 The 
particularity aspect of standards allows the court to over-
come the overinclusiveness and underinclusivenss of general 
rules. However, this aspect undermines the formal realiz-
ability goal by increasing the number of jurisdictional 
16Id . at 1689-90. 
17 Id . at 1691 (During the discussion on formality Kennedy refers to 
Fuller, "Consideration and Form," 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).) 
18Id ., at 1688. 
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questions, i.e., what is the scope of a particular rule?19 
Finally, the regulatory aspect of standards attaches sanc-
tions to courses of conduct in order to discourage them. 20 
In "Form and Substance, II Professor Kennedy also devel-
ops the dichotomy of altruism and individualism, suggesting 
that these two rhetorical modes are useful for dealing with 
substantive issues in private law disputes. Individualism 
refers to the pursuit of individual goals. Professor Ken-
nedy writes: 
The essence of individualism is the mak~ng of a sharp 
distinction between one's interests and those of others, 
combined with the belief that a preference for one's own 
interests is legitimate, but that one sh~uld be willing to 
respect" the rules that make it possible to coexist with 
others similarly self-interested. The form of conduct 
associated with individualism is self-reliance. This means 
an insistence on defining and achieving objectives without 
help from others (Le. without being dependent on them or 
asking sacrifices of them). It means accepting that they 
will neither share their gains nor one's own losses. And it 
means a firm conviction that I am entitled to enjoy the 
benefits of my efforts without an oblig~\ion to share or 
sacrifice them to the interests of others. 
Professor Kennedy argues that the certainty of indivi-
dualism is embodied in the calculations of Holmes' "bad 
man, II who is concerned with the law only as a means or an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of his antisocial ends. He 
explains, liThe essence of individualism certainty through 
rules is that because it identifies for the bad man the 
191d . at 1689-90. 
201d . at 1690-94. 
21 1d . at 1713. (In his discussion on liberalism Professor Kennedy 
referS-to nineteenth century treatments of self reliance: R. EMERSON 
"Self-Reliance," in ESSAYS, FIRST SERIES 37 (1847) and H. SPENCER, 
JUSTICE (1981), and Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 173 (1858).) 
9 
precise limits of toleration for his badness, it authorizes 
him to hew as close as he can to those limits."22 
Altruism refers to the pursuit of broad societal goals. 
Professor Kennedy writes: 
[T]he essence of altruism is the. belief that one ought not to 
indulge a sharp preference for one's own interest over those 
of others. Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, 
and to be merciful. It has roots in culture, in religion, 
ethics and art, that are as deep as those of individualism. 
(Love thy neighbor as thyself.) 
The simplest of the practices that represent altruism are 
sharing and sacrifice. Sharing is a static concept, suggest-
ing an existing distribution of goods which the sharers 
rearrange. It means giving up to another gains or wealth 
that one has produced oneself or that have. come to one 
through some good fortune. It is motivated by a sense of 
duty or by a sense that the other's satisfaction is a reward 
at least comparable to the satisfacti2~ one might have de-
rived from consuming the thing oneself. 
If individualism is embodied in the "bad man" concept, 
then altruism is embodied in the "good man" notion: lithe law 
is certain when not the bad but the good man is secure in 
the expectation that if he goes forward in good faith, with 
due regard for his neighbor's interest as well as his own, 
and a suspicious eye to the temptations of greed, then the 
law will not turn up as a dagger in his back. 1I24 
Kennedy asserts that altruism leads to a willingness to 
resort to standards in administration of justice while indi-
vidualism harmonizes with rigid rules rigidly defined. He 
explains: 
22Id . at 1773. 
23Id . at 1717. 
24Id . at 1773-74. 
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There is a connection, in the rhetoric of private law, between 
individualism and a preference for rules, and between altruism 
and a preference for standards. The substantive and formal 
dimensions are related because the same moral, economic and 
political arguments appear in each. For most of the areas of 
conflict, the two sides emerge as biases or tendencies whose 
proponents have much in common and a large basis for adjust-
ment through the analysis of the particularities of fact 
situa,tions. But there is a deeper level, at which the indivi-
dualist/formalist and altruist/ informalist operate from 
flatly contradictory visions of the universe. Fortunately or 
unfortunately, the contradiction is as much internal as exter-
nal, since there are few participants in modern legal culture25 
who avoid the sense of believing in both sides simultaneously. 
He views the conflict of individualism as having three 
distinct phases, including, (1) the antebellum period (1800-
1870) in which the legal conflict was often in terms of 
IImorality vs. POliCYi ll (2) classical individualism (1850-
1940) in which IIfree will" was all important and (3) modern 
legal thought (1900 to the present) in which courts are 
increasingly aware of a "sense of contradiction.,,26 During 
25Id . at 1776. 
26For a more thorough treatment of the three phases of the conflict 
between individualism and altruism, one !lhould read "Form and Sub-
stance," supra note 5, at 1725-37. For the purpose of this article, the 
following summary should suffice: 
The Antebellum Period (1800-1871) Moralit vs. Polic 
[I ndividualism was at first not an ethic in conflict with the 
ethic of altruism, but a set of pragmatic arguments perceived 
as in conflict with ethics in general. Antebellum judges and 
commentators referred to these pragmatic arguments by the 
generic name of "policy" and contrasted it to "morality." 
* * * Classical Individualism (1850-1940): Free Will 
[C]lassical individualism rejected the idea that particular 
rules represented an ad hoc compromise between policy and 
altruist morality. Rather,- the rules represented a fully 
principled and consistent solution both to the ethical and to 
the practical dilemmas of legal order. 
* * * 
11 
this modern legal period, courts not only have rejected 
classical individualism but also have rejected the notion 
that morality is unequivocally altruist and policy unequivo-
cally individualist. He suggests that the modern phase of 
conflict occurs over three main issues which he calls, 
somewhat arbitrarily, community vs. autonomy, regulation vs. 
facilitation, and paternalism vs. self-determination. 27 
(footnote 26 continued) 
Modern Legal Thought (1900 to the present): The Sense of 
Contradiction. 
[I]n private law, modern legal thought begins with the rejec-
tion of Classical individualism. Its premise is that Classi-
cal theory failed to show either that the genius of our insti-
tutions is individualist or that it is possible to deduce con-
crete legal rules from concepts like liberty, property or 
bodily security. For this reason, morality and policy re-
appear in modern discussions, in place of first principles and 
logic. The problem is that morality is no longer unequi-
vocally altruist -- there is a conflict of moralities. Nor is 
policy any longer unequivocally individualist -- there are 
arguments for collectivism, regulation, the welfare state, 
along with the theory of economic development through laissez-
faire. This conflict of morality with morality and of policy 
with policy pervades every important issue of private law. 
In private law, this modern phase of conflict occurs over 
'three main issues, which I will call, somewhat arbitrarily, 
community vs. autonomy, regulation vs. facilitation, and 
paternalism vs. self-determination. 
27professor Kennedy uses contract law doctrines to describe what he 
means by the three main issues in the modern phase of the conflict. The 
following delineation appears in "Form and Substance", supra note 5, at 
1733-37: 
(a) Community vs. Autonomy -- The issue here is the extent to 
which one person should have to share or make sacrifices in 
the interest of another in the absence of agreement or other 
manifestation of intention. 
* * * Given the decision to regard contract .and tort law as 
compensation rather than punitive, the altruist and indivi-
dualist have disagreements at three levels: 
scope of obligation: Given a particular relationship or 
sitaution, is there any duty at all to look out for the inter-
ests of the other? 
12 
The moral, economic and political conflict and the 
contradictory visions of the universe in "Form and Substance" 
are explored further in "The Structure of Blackstone's 
Commentaries." Contending that the conflict is an aspect of 
a fundamental contradiction within modern legal thought, 
(footnote 27 continued) 
intensity of obligation: Given duty, how great is the duty 
on the scale from mere abstention from violence to the highest 
fiduciary obligation? 
extent of liability for consequences: Given breach of duty, 
how far down the chain of causation should we extend liability? 
The individualist position is the restriction of obliga-
tions of sharing and sacrifice. This means being opposed to 
the broadening, intensifying and extension of liability and 
opposed to the liberalization of excuses once duty is esta-
blished ... The altruist position is the expansion of the 
network of liability and also the liberalization of excuses. 
(b) Regulation vs. Facilitation -- The issue here is the use 
of bargaining power as the determinant of the distribution of 
desired objects and the allocation of resources to different 
uses ... 
There are many approaches to the control of bargaining 
power, including: 
Incapacitation of classes of people deemed particularly 
likely to lack adequate bargaining power (children, lunatics, 
etc.) with the effect that they can void their contracts if 
they want to. 
Outlawing particular tactics, such as the use of physical 
violence, duress of goods, threats to inflict malicious harm, 
fraudulent statements, "bargaining in bad faith," etc. 
Control of the competitive structure of markets, either by 
atomizing concentrated economic power or by creating counter-
vailing centers strong enough to bargain equally. 
Direct policing of the substantive fairness of bargains, 
whether by direct price fixing or quality specification, by 
setting maxima or minima, or by announcing a standard such as 
"reasonableness" or "unconscionability." 
The individualist position is that judges ought not to 
conceive of themselves as regulators of the use of economic 
power. This means conceiving of the legal system as a limited 
13 
Kennedy argues: 
The fundamental contradiction -- that relations with others 
are both necessary to and incompatible with our freedom -- is 
not only intense. It is also pervasive. First, it is an 
aspect of our experience of every form of social life. It 
(footnote 27 continued) 
set of existing restraints imposed on the state of nature, and 
then refusing to extend those restraints to new situations. 
The altruist position is that existing restraints represent an 
attempt to achieve distributive justice which the judges 
should forward rather than impede. 
(c) Paternalism vs. Self-Determination This issue is 
distinct from that of regulation vs. facilitation because it 
arises in situations not of conflict but of error. A party to 
an agreement or, one who has unilaterally incurred a legal 
obligation seeks to void it on the grounds that they acted 
against t~eir "real" interests .... 
No issue of bargaining power is necessarily involved in 
such sitautions. For example: 
Liquidated damage clauses freely agreed to by both par-
ties are voided on grounds of unreasonableness. 
* * * Merger clauses that would waive liability for fraudulent 
misrepresentations are struck do.wn or reinterpreted. 
rk * * 
Persons lacking in capacity are allowed to void contracts 
that are uncoerced and substantively fair. 
Consideration doctrine sometimes renders promises unen-
forceable because there was no "real" exchange, as in the 
cases of the promissory note of a widow given in exchange for 
a discharge of her husband's worthless debts, or. that of a 
contract for "conjuring~" 
Fraud and unconscionability doctrine protect against 
"unfair surprise" in situations where a party is a victim of 
his own foolishness rather than the exercise of power. 
The individualist position is that the parties themselves are 
the best and only legitimate judges of th~ir own interests, 
subject to a limited number of exceptions, such as incapacity. 
People should be allowed to behave foolishly, do themselves 
harm, and otherwise refuse to accept any other person's view 
of what is best for them. . . . The altruist response is that 
the paternalist rules are not exceptions, but the representa-
tives of a developed counterpolicy of forcing people to look 
to the "real" itnerests of those they deal with. This policy 
is as legitimate as that of self-determination and should be 
extended as circumstances permit or require. 
14 
arises in the relations of lovers, spouses, parents and child-
ren, neighbors, employers and employee; trading partne~s, 
colleagues, and so forth. Second, within law ... it is not 
only an aspect, but the very essence of every problem. There 
simply are no legal issues that do not involve directly t~ 
problem of the legitimate content of collective coercion, 
since there is b definition no Ie al roblem until someone 
has at least imagined that (s he might involve the force of 
the state. And this is not just a matter of definition. The 
more sophisticated a person's thinking, regardless of her 
political stance, the more likely she is to believe that all 
issues within a doctrinal field reduce to a single dilemma ~ 
the degree of collective as 0i8osed to individual self-deter-
mination that is appropriate. 
It is here that the term "liberalism" is used to des-
cribe the mode of mediation or denial which allows one 
living in such a mode to not experience or not acknowledge 
the contradiction. He explains "liberalism": 
[F]or the moment, I hope it is enough to define it very rough-
ly in terms of a splitting of the universe of others into 
radically opposed imaginary entities. One of these is "civil 
society," a realm of free interaction between private indivi-
duals who are unthreatening to one another because the other 
entity, "the state," forces them to respect one another's 
rights. In civil society, others are available for good 
fusion as private individual respecters of rights; through the 
state, they are available for good fusion as participants in 
the collective experience of enforcing rights. A person who 
lives the lib'2~al mode can effectively deny the fundam~ntal 
contradiction. 
Kennedy readily admits that his notion of Illiberalism" is 
rather difficult to grasp. In fact, he gives a series of 
definitions or descriptions of "liberalism," at various 
levels of abstraction, as the need arises in his discussion 
in "The structure of Blackstone's Commentaries." 
Another critical legal theorist, writing in the same 
vein as Kennedy, defines "liberalism" in this way: 
28"The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries," supra note 5, at 213 
(emphasis added). 
291d . at 217. 
15 
Liberalism is a term of many definitions, but it is suffi-
cient here to say that liberalism is the dominant ideology in 
the modern Western world, an ideology that pervades our views 
of human nature and of social life. Liberalism, as I use the 
term, should not be distinguished from conservatism, as it is 
in modern American political jargon, but should be interpreted 
to include, and be broader than, both these strands of Ameri-
can political thought . . . . it describes the way we under-
stand ourselves and society as a whole. Liberalism is our 
world view, one that emerged from such theorists as Hobbes and 
Locke, was developed by both Bentham and Rousseau, and was 
forcefully expressed'in the mid-nineteenth century in the work 
of John Stuart Mill. . . 
For some, liberalism is characterized by its emphasis on 
the belief that the passions can be subordinated to reason, 
that the world can be rationalized both in terms of thought 
and by organization of social life, and that the way to do ~8 
is by a scientific dissection of all aspects of life . . . 
In summation, critical legal theory argues that liberal-
ism is a view based on seeing the world as a series of 
complex dualities. It is based on the IIfundamental proposi-
tion that the world is divided into spheres of reason and of 
desire, of fact and of subjective need for communal rela-
tionships, of the fr~e interaction of civil society and of 
the demands of the state, of the controlling importance of 
empirical fact and the controlling importance of ideas. 31 A 
person who lives in the liberal mode can effectively deny 
tpe fundamental contradiction32 that relations with others 
30 Frug, supra note 1, at 1074-75. 
31Id . ·at 1075. 
32 Proie&sor Kennedy discusses the "fundamental contradiction" at 
greater detail in "The Structure of Blackstone I s Commentaries," supra 
note 5, at 211-12. 
[M]6st participants in American legal culture believe that the 
goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on 
and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is 
necessary to achieve it. 
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are both necessary to and incompatible with our freedom. 
This fundamental contradiction is played out in our 
legal system because participants in the legal system (e.g. 
judges, lawyers, public officials, legislators, etc.) are 
able to mediate or deny the contradiction through the recog-
. nition of and use of alternative rhetorical modes for deal-
'ing with the ultimate question of the degree of collective 
versus individualistic self-determination that is appro-
priate in the resolution of a legal dispute. If altruism 
and individualism are viewed as end-points along a spectrum, 
then varying degrees of collective or individual self-deter-
mination are appropriate in almost any legal situation. 
II Communi ty, II IIregulation, II and IIpaternalism ll are abstrac-
i tions approaching the altruism end-point. IIAutonomy,1I 
IIregulation, II and IIself-determination ll are abstractions 
(footnote 32 continued) 
Others (families, friends, bureaucrats, cultural figures, the 
state) are necessary if we are to become persons at all --
they provide us with the stuff of our selves and protect us in 
crucial ways against destruction. Even when we seem to our-
selves to be most alone, others are with us, incorporated in 
us through processes of language, cognition, and feelings that 
are, simply as a matter of biology, collective aspects of our 
individuality. 
Moreover, we are not always alone. We sometimes experience 
fusion with others, in groups of two or even two million, and 
it is a good rather than a bad experience. 
But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the uni-
verse of others threatens us with annihilation and urges upon 
us forms of fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than 
good ... Through our existence as members of collectives, we 
impose on others and have imposed on us hierarchical struc-
tures of power, welfare, and access to enlightenment that are 
illegitimate, whether based on birth into a particular social 
class or on the accident of genetic endowment. 
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approaching the individualism end-point. 
There is a connection between individualism and a 
preference for rules, and between altruism and a preference 
for standards. The three dimensions of equitable standards --
'llprinciples/policies, II "particularity, II and "regulation" are 
related to the "community," "regulation," and "paternalism" 
aspects of altruism. Simultaneously, the three dimensions 
of rules -- "formal realizability, II II generality, II and "for-
malityll are related to the "autonomy, II II facilitation, " and 
II self-determination" aspects of individualism. Professor 
Kennedy attributes th~ interrelatedness of the substantive 
and formal dichotomies to the fact that the same moral, 
economic and political arguments appear in each. While he 
views the individualism/rules dichotomies and the altruism/ 
standards dichotomies as two sides emerging as biases or 
tendencies, which operate from contradictory visions of the 
universe, he also recognizes that many participants in the 
legal culture believe in both . sides simultaneously. The 
individualist wants to stop short of egotism while the 
altruist wants to stop short of saintliness; 
Thus, the (above) opposed rhetorical modes jurists use 
in disposing of a legal dispute reflect a deeper level of 
contradiction. We are divided, among ourselves,. and, also 
within ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of humanity 
and society, and between radically different aspirations for 
our common future. 
The Kennedy liber~list construct has been praised by 
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some of Professor Kennedy's contemporaries33 and criticized 
by others. 34 It is beyond the scope of this article to 
critique the construct in an in-depth fashion. . For the 
purposes of this article ,this angle of vision should be 
utilized for its pedagogical value. It is the central 
premise of this paper that third world legal issues squarely 
confront the contradiction in ~odern western legal thought. 
The Chart on the next page is a summary of the Kennedy 
liberalist construct or, what Professor Kennedy prefers to 
call, "an open-textured angle of vision." The substantive 
dichotomy within the construct has been modified to reflect 
these authors belief that the altruism-individualism contin-
uum is itself an aspect of a larger spectrum in which total-
itarianism and anarchism are the extremes of altruism and 
individualism respectively. It is the purpose of the Chart 
to serve as a quick reference for certain terms that will 
appear in sections II through V of the article. 
33See FruI, supra note 1. See also HORWITZ, supra note 8. 
l 34See generally, C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981) and A. KRONMAN 
! and R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979). 
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THE KENNEDY LIBERALIST CONSTRUCT 
FORM: 
EQUITABLE STANDARDS 
producing ad hoc dec1s1ons with 
relatively-rittle precedential value 
DIMENSIONS OF FORM: 
1-
2. 
3. 
---
PrinciplesiPolicies 
Particular1ty 
Regulation or 
Rules Designed to Deter Wrongful Behavior 
,SUBSTANCE: 
ALTRUISM leads to a willingness to 
resort to standards in administration 
The SUBSTANTIVE SPECTRUM: 
1-
2. 
3. 
Clearly defined, highly 
administrable GENERAL RULES 
Formal Realizability 
General1ty 
Forma11ty 
INDIVIDUALISM harmonizes with rigid 
rules r1g1dly defined. 
Totalitarianism----Saintliness---ALTRUISM-------INDIVIDUALISM------Egoism-----Anarchism 
DIMENSIONS OF FORM: 
The LIBERALISM COMPONENT: 
1-
2. 
3. 
'Community 
Regulat10n 
Paterna11sm 
1-
2. 
3. 
Autonomy 
Facil1tation 
Self-Determ1nation 
The fundamental contradiction is that most participants in American legal culture believe 
that the goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the 
communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it. . • . At the same time that it forms 
and protects us, ·the universe of others (i.e., families, friends, bureaucrats, cultural figures, 
the state, etc.) threaten us with annihilation and urges upon us fusion (with others) that are 
quite plainly bad rather than good. 
Thus, the (above) opposed rhetorical modes jurists use reflect a deeper level of contra-
diction. We are divided, among ourselves, and, also within ourselves, between irreconcilable 
visions of humanity and society, and between radically different aspirations for our common 
future. 
See generally, D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance In Private Law Adjudication," 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1985 (1976), and "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries," 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979). 
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section II 
Law of the Sea 
In a 1967 speech to the united Nations, the Maltese 
Ambassador, Arvid Pardo, called for the creation of an 
international authority to oversee the exploitation of 
deep-sea resources. 35 The Ambassador claimed these re-
sources36 as the common heritage of mankind, to be used 
primarily for the benefit of the poorer nations of the 
world. 
To develop the appropriate machinery for the regulation 
of the seas, the Third united Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea was convened. 37 The Conference has been success-
ful in reaching agreement on such varied issues as marine 
pollution, conservation, fisheries and freedom of navigation 
through straits. 38 However, one remaining point of conten-
tion is the question of production limitations from deep 
seabed mining. Such a limitation is of particular concern 
35Statement by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, November 1, 1967, 22 
GAOR, A/C.1/PV. 1515 & 1516 (1967). 
36Minerals expected to be produced from sea -bed mining are cobalt, 
manganese, nickel, and copper. 
37The United Nations General Assembly created an Ad Hoc Committee to 
study the peaceful uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction. (See G.A. Re. 2340, 22 GAOR Supp. 16 
A/6/76, at 14 (1968). This Ad Hoc Committee was replaced the following 
year by the Committee on the-Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (G.A. Re. 2467 A, 23 
GAOR Supp. 18 A/7218, at 15 (1969). This Committee later became the 
preparatory body for the Third World Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. The Conference began in 1973 and, after nine sessions, has 
produced a Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea. See U.N. Doc. A Conf. 
62/WP. 10/Rev. 3 (1980). 
38R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES, 214, (1979) 
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to developing countries, typically more dependent on the 
minerals concerned for export earnings and government reve-
nue than developed countries. 
countries with the requisite mining technology argue 
that under current international law, the seabeds are un-
claimed territory. The occupation of unclaimed territory by 
a state is a method of acquiring such terri tory and is 
recognized under current international law. 39 This theory 
is analogous to the ancient Roman concept of res nullius, 
meaning a thing which has no owner, the property of no-
body.40 Res nullius was originally acquired by occupancy, 
that is by taking possession of it. 41 
Those nations lacking this technology argue that seabed 
minerals are not res ·nullius but res communes or, "those 
things which are used and enjoyed by everyone, even in sin-
39 See generally Charney "United States Interests in a Convention on 
the Law of the Sea: The Case for Continued Efforts," 11 vAlID. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 39, 41 (1978). 
40BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as 
BLACK'S]. 
41To acquire ownership by occupancy, four conditions need to be met: 
1. The thing must be a res nullius, a thing which never had an 
owner or has been abandoned; 
2. It must be a thing which is capable of ownership, that is, 
res in commercio; 
3. It must be brought into the actual possession or control of 
the aspiring owner; and 
4. The person must acquire it with the intention of assuming 
ownership of it, that is, possession must be juridicial. 
See STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 385 (1912). 
22 
gle parts, but can never be exclusively acquired as a whole, 1142 
such as air or light. 43 
Res communes has also been defined as those things 
which may be reduced to monetary terms, but are incapable of 
appropriation to individuals. 1144 Under this definition, 
sea-bed minerals could not be considered as res communes. 
Indeed, it is precisely because these minerals may easily be 
converted into dollars and appropriated by individuals, that 
the contoversy arises. 
When the Kennedy liberalist construct is applied to the 
legal status of the mineral wealth of the seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction, one notes that the res nullius (a 
thing with no owner) concept is individualistic in its 
SUbstantive nature and rule-oriented in form. On the other 
hand, res communes (a thing owned by all) is altruistic in 
nature and standard-oriented in form. 
Res nullius exhibits a bias toward the value of indivi-
dualism. The concept implicitly makes a distinction between 
the interests of those countries which have the technologi-
cal capability to discover and exploit the sea-bed minerals 
and those countries which do not. Assuming arguendo that 
these minerals are the property of nobody, then those indus-
trialized nations which have the financial and technological 
means to explore ways of tapping the deep-sea wealth are at 
42BLACK'S, supra note 40, at 1469. 
43Id . 
44BUCKLAND, THE MAIN INSTITUTION OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 91 (1931). 
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an advantage. Res nullius encourages lIautonomy,II45 "facili-
tation"46 and Iself-determination"47 on the part of indus-
trialized nations in the mining and exploitation of the deep 
sea minerals. 
Res nullius also has a rule-oriented content because it 
identifies for the mining interests the precise limits of 
toleration for their desires: those who are capable of 
discovering and exploiting the unclaimed sea riches may do 
so. The concept of res nullius leads to a more "clearly 
defined administrable rule II than res communes which ulti-
mately places a great deal of discretion in an international 
authority to establish regulations for seabed mining. 
When one considers the II formal realizability, II "gener-
ality," and IIformalityll dimensions of general rules,48 a res 
nullius rule of law does all the things that Professor 
Kennedy argues that rules attempt to do. It leads to more 
predictable results should a dispute over mining or exploi-
tation arise. It places a restra"int on the arbitrariness of 
the international tribunal (e.g. united Nations or the pro-
45 
"Form and Substance," supra note 5, at 1733-37. In this context, 
res nullius supports and maintains the autonomy of the Western and 
Soviet businessmen interested in exploiting the deep sea-bed. Such 
businessmen are very skeptical of a seabed authority which would contin-
ually substitute its judgment for the judgment of businessmen. 
46 Id. Res nullius facilitates the many of the financial goals and 
expectations:of the Western and Soviet business interests. 
47Id . Res nullius supports the self-determination of the Western and 
Soviet mining interests. In other words, the mining interests them-
selves, as opposed to an international regulatory regime, are the best 
and legitimate judges of their own interests. 
48Id . at 1687-94. 
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posed Seabed Authority) deciding the dispute. And finally 
it allows the framer of the legal directive to establish 
precedents that are useful when the international tribunal 
decides seabed mining and exploitation disputes in the 
future. The international tribunal is likely to apply the 
rigid rule of law to the fact situation when two or more 
litigants claim a right, title or interest in and to the 
same seabed minerals. And property rules regarding intent 
to control and the actual exercise of dominion and control 
over the res (in this case the seabed mineral) would most 
likely apply. 
The res communes exhibits an altruistic vision in its 
substantive nature; it is based on the belief that there 
should not be a sharp distinction between the interests of 
those countries with the financial and technological means 
to exploit the sea-bed minerals and those countries which do 
not. The res communes concept suggests that the sea-bed 
minerals are to be used and enjoyed by all nations. Like 
the broad notion of altruism, it "suggests an existing 
distribution of good which the sharers rearrange.,,49 Under 
this notion the industrialized nations of the world are 
expected to share the deep sea riches and thereby sacrifice 
some of the profits which would be made in the discovery and 
exploitation of these resources. Res communes would encour-
49Id . at 1717. 
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age the values of "community,,50 "regulation,,51 and "patern-
alism,,52 on the part of the total world community with 
respect to the mining and exploitation of the deep sea 
minerals. 
Res communes is "standard-oriented" in form because it 
tends to lead to equi table resul ts which are ad hoc in 
- --
nature but of little precedential value. Any international 
tribunal deciding rights under such a standard would be 
given a great deal of discretion in deciding a dispute and 
in fashioning legal directives that will inform the next set 
of disputes. If the tribunal were confronted with a title 
dispute, it is more likely to approach the questions regard-
ing intent to control and exercise of dominion and control 
in a manner which attempts to balance equities on both sides 
of the adversarial line rather than applying a rigid rule to 
a narrow fact situation. such a body would essentially be 
allocating or reallocating the deep sea resources. Thus, it 
is more likely to promulgate rules regarding what is a 
"reasonable" use of the deep-sea minerals in a given fact 
situation. 
50 Id. at 1733-37. Res communes supports the connunity notion of 
sharing and sacrificing, namely, that one should have to share or make 
sacrifices in the interest of another in the absence of an agreement. 
The rationale is the community at large benefits from mutual sharing and 
sacrificing. 
SlId. Res communes advocates the use of regulatory forces to achieve 
distributive-justice which the international treaty-making body should 
forward rather than impede. 
s2Id . Res communes is paternalistic, as it suggests that the Western 
and Soviet-sea-bed mining investors are not the best and only legitimate 
judges of their own interests. 
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Under current international practice, the minerals in 
the sea-bed have been considered as res nullius. Because 
the res nullius concept comes under the traditional freedom 
of the seas doctrine within international law, the developed 
nations have had certain advantages during the pendancy of 
treaty negotiations. senator Daniel Moynihan, former U. S. 
Ambassador to the united Nations, asserted: 
[D]o the developing nations understand that by entering into 
the (Law of the Sea) negotiations, and remaining faithful to 
them, the United States and the western 'nations generally have 
agreed to negotiate for, and in the bargaining sense, to pay 
for rights which exist in the absence of a treaty? . . . we 
did not have .to do this. . . the perfect right to extract 
mineral resources from the deep ocean beyond the 5~ontinental 
Shelf. Moreover, we have the technology to do so. 
The developed countries have always asserted that the 
"common heritage principle" promulgated by Ambassador Pardo 
will have to be decided by the Law of the Sea Conference and 
until that time, the traditional doctrines are in force. 
Even now, the crucial point of contention over the 
united states' reluctance to sign the Law of the Sea treaty 
concerns the res nullius, res communes issue. without 
uni ted States' approval, such a treaty would be useless. 
The ultimate outcome of the Conference will indicate just 
how effective such international forums are in presenting 
the Third World vision on rights in the natural wealth of 
the globe. The Kennedy construct shows the clear dichotomy 
53See T. Beuttler, "The Composite Text and Module Mining-Overregula-
tion As A Threat to the Common Heritage of Mankind," 1 HASTINGS INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 167, 193 (Winter 1977) (Senator Moynihan of New York, 
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, gave the speech at the 
launching of the U.S.S. nuclear submarine New York City, in Groton, 
Conn. on June 18, 1977).) 
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between that vision, and the vision of the industrialized 
nations. The construct also suggests that the choice of a 
legal standard, whether it be ~ nullius or res communes, 
is a political and ideological choice. It is not based on 
neutral jurisprudential principles. That fact alone, dic-
tates the pressing importance of a fair and equitable 
solution to a problem of 'such profound geo-economic dimen-
sions. 
Section III 
Indigenous Indian Nations'Development and 
Control of Natural Resources 
Liberal ideology and imagery mandate that the modern 
states' attitude toward questions regarding control and 
development of the natural resources belonging to Indian na-
tions be appropriative and ultimately exploitive. 54 Numer-
54See "Indian Rights Rediscovered," N.Y. Times, March 5, 1982, page A 
28 (editorial page): 
[N]o offense against human rights is so persistent as the 
mistreatment of Native Americans. They have been butchered 
and enslaved for centuries; their lands have been stolen, 
their bodies infected and their culture trampled. .. (T)he 
atrocities against Indians in the Americas continue in many 
places: 
In Chile, about 500,00 Mapuches living on 3,000 reserva-
tions are menaced by a 1979 decree that abolished their claim 
to lands awarded them more than a century ago. 
In Paraguay, the pathetic remnants of the Toba-Maskoy tribe 
have been forcibly moved to arid land, where their extinctions 
seems likely. In Brazil, disease and greed imperil the Yano-
mani, perhaps the last large South American tribe to have so 
far excaped the embrace of "civilization." Their traditional 
lands are being invaded by mineral prospectors and their 
resistance to European diseases is negligible. 
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ous indigenous Indian nations of North and South America 
reside on lands containing vast quanti ties of the hemi-
sphere I s resource wealth. 55 Yet, wi thin the legal systems 
of modern liberal states surrounding those nations,56 few, 
if any, meaningful restraints exist to protect and advance 
the interests of indigenous cultures in managing, developing 
and benefitting from their resource wealth. 57 
(footnote 54 continued) 
In Peru, about 15,000 Campa and Amuesha Indians are need-
lessly endangered by a highway that would connect what the 
Government. bills as "men without land to lands without men," 
in the Amazon. The United States has earmarked a quarter of a 
million dollars in aid to this project, which could still be 
modified to spare the Indians. 
In Guatemala, the rightist military regime has been clear-
ing Indians out of the western Peten region, for security and 
oil exploration. Perhaps 70,000 Guatemalans, most of them 
Indian, ,are now refugees in Mexico. The killing of Indians 
has become commonplace, with left-wing guerrillas committing 
their share of atrocities. If Indian rights are really the 
concern, there's much work to be done. -
55See THE SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF RAPID RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT ON 
NATIVE PEOPLE, GEISLER, USNER, GREEN and WEST, eds. (1982). 
56See generally, R. Chambers and M. Price, "Regulating Sovereignty: 
Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Land," 26 STAN. L. REV. 
1061 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Chambers and Price), where the authors 
note that under 25 U.S.C.A.s 415, Indian lands can be leased for such 
activities as mining, only with permission of the Secretary of the 
Interior. The authors write on page 1061-62: 
[S]tatutes such as section 415, which wholly or partially 
restrain the alienation of Indian lands, have been sustained 
as exercises of the federal guardianship or trust responsibil-
ity. But while the trust responsibility serves as a source of 
the 'Secretary's approval power, it is unclear whether and to 
what extent it furnishes standards which limit his discretion 
in administrative exercise of that power. . . . 
57Id . at 1067. 
Chambers and Price argue that in the context of leasing of tribal 
l~~ds in the U.S., subject to Secretarial approval: 
29 
The questions regarding the rights of native cultures 
in the modern states have traditionally been analyzed within 
the confines of the Doctrine of Discovery58 (lithe Doctrine"). 
(footnote 57 continued) 
58 
[I] t has become increasingly important to develop a coherent 
theory of the Secretary's trust duties and the purposes of his 
trusteeship. A virtually unconfined discretion now has poten-
tially hazardous implications. Tribal self-government is 
endangered by the likelihood that the Secretary may have the 
authority and duty to disapprove leases desired by the tribe 
or its members. Unbounded discretion also creates the possi-
bility of arbitrariness and uncertainty, two conditions that 
discourage development on reservation lands.· Jurisdictional 
disputes flourish among state, tribal; and federal governments 
in part because the Secretary has failed to act decisively in 
proposing consistent or careful jurisdictional arrangements. 
These costs were barely tolerable when leasing was a less 
significant aspect of tribal political and economic develop-
ment. But since 1955, the burdens of uncertainty have become 
aggravated as tribes themselves turn increasingly to maj or 
development projects and as the environmental and social 
implications of long-term leases have become far more pro-
nounced. 
See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 
(1823) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]: 
On the discovery of this immense continent, th egreat nations 
of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of 
it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent of-
fered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all; 
and the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an 
apology for considering them as a people over whom the super-
ior genius of Europe migh claim an ascendency. The potentates 
of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves 
that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the 
new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in 
exchange for unlimited independence. But, as they were all in 
pursuit of nearly the· same object, it was necessary, in o.rder 
to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each 
other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge 
as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all 
asserted, should be regulated as between themselves. This 
principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by 
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against 
all other European governments, which title might be consum-
mated by possession. 
21 U.S. at 572. 
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The Doctrine holds that upon discovery of European nations, 
lands inhabited by Indian cultures came within the control 
and sovereignty of the discovering European country.59 The 
Doctrine has served as the paradigmatic model for analyzing 
all legal and political issues respecting Anglo-Indian 
relations. 60 
When the Doctrine is analyzed within the Kennedy libe-
ralist construct, one immediately recognizes its highly 
individualistic substantive nature. It makes a sharp dis-
tinction between the interests of discovering European 
nations and the discovered Indian nations. The Doctrine 
reflects the belief that a preference for the interests of 
the discovering European nations was legitimate, and that 
discovered Indian nations should be willing to respect the 
rules that made it possible fur the discovering European 
nations to co-exist with one another. 
The effect of the Doctrine was to sanction a monopo-
listic and unilateral relationship between the discovering 
European sovereignty and the indigenous native culture now 
within its exclusive control. Euphemistically labelled a 
guardian-ward relationship,61 European-Indian r~lations now 
were marked by total domination and an unyielding determi-
nation to forceably assimilate the non-aggressive Indian 
59 See generally, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (S Pet) 1, 8 L. 
Ed. 25(1831). 
60 See generally, N. Newton, "At The Whim of the Sovereign: Aborignal 
Title Reconsidered," 31 HAST. L. J. 1215 (1980). 
61 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 586-90. 
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nations. 62 This reduced-wardship status under the Doctrine 
has legitimated a wide spectrum of paternalistic and self-
serving interference in tribal life by western legal insti-
tutions. 
In the united States, for example, the Doctrine has 
been used by the Supreme Court to legitimate the denial of 
Indian title to lands held and occupied since time immemo-
rial. 63 The Doctrine has also served to deny Indian nations 
the ability to advance claims and protect rights in united 
States courts due to their postulated "diminished" quasi-
sovereign status. 64 Final11, the Doctrine has served as the 
informing principle and underlying jurisprudential rational-
ization for denying Indian nations the capacity to try 
non-Indians in tribal courts for criminal offenses committed 
on Indian reservations. 65 
Liberal theory and ideology denies indigenous cultures 
the right to self-determination. It has imposed a harsh 
individualistic value structure upon the tribe and upon the 
approach of the United States government toward its Indian 
"wards. II Unable to meet, or challenge western standards of 
62See R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as BERKHOFER]. See also V. DeLORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 
(1974) . 
63See TeeHit-Toh v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 755 S.Ct. 313, 99 L. 
Ed. 314 (1955). 
64See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587-90. See also United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375, 6 S. Ct. 1109, 30 L. Ed. 228 (1886). 
65See Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435· U.S. 191, 98 S. Ct. 
1011, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978). 
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civilization, tribal culture early on was relegated to an 
. f' t 66 l.n erl.or s atus. This status only served to legitimate 
the American frontier mentality, with its individualistic 
appropriative premises. It also transformed that mentality 
into law and legal doctrine. 67 An entire reservation sys-
tem -- marked by the total control of the united states 
government, and enforced by its courts -- resulted in the 
disintegration of tribal government, and leadership. The 
federal government and the courts gradually usurped, and in 
some instances, outlawed, expressions of tribal culture. 68 
The ultimate dilemma posed by the Tribe for liberal 
thought is its totally altruistic vision of human culture, 
requiring each member of the group "to make sacrifices, to 
share, and to be merciful. ,,69 Unable to grasp tribal group 
dynamics, the capacity of the tribe to subsume indi vidual 
desires and serve as an effective advocate of individual 
group rights, Western thought relegated the tribe to the 
status of a juristic anomoly, the "quasi-sovereign entity." 
This relegation effectively denied the oppressive and alien-
ating structure created by the reservation system. The 
tribe, as a vehicle of group self-determination was inferior 
66See BERKHOFER, supra note 62, at 1-25. 
67 Id . at 113 and following. 
68For an account of the violent supression of one form of Indian 
religious expression, see the Ghost Dance, W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN 
AMERICA (1975) pp. 217-223. See generally, D. BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT 
WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1970) at 367-389. 
69 Id . at 1717. 
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to western modes of political organization. Therefore, the 
United states, in a guardian capacity had to civilize its 
Indian wards. This could only be accomplished by total 
control of the Indian's social, ecnomic and political life. 
This pattern of legitimation and denial has been copied 
in virutally every Western Hemisphere's governments' rela-
tions with its indigenous civilizations. The implications 
of such a "legal" approach to questions concerning tribal 
rights are immense. Under the liberal construct, all ques-
tions regarding control and development of Indian culture 
and natural resources are to be decided, not by those cul-
tures, but by the assimilative and appropriative governments 
which surround and threaten to engulf them. 
Yet, wi thin the past two decades, especially in the 
united states, a new consciousness has emerged to challenge 
the familiar liberal approach to questions regarding the 
rights .to self-determination for Indian tribes. 70 Escaping 
the shackles imposed by the paternalistic reservation-welfare 
system, Indian tribes have begun to assert a vision totally 
at variance with liberal thought. This vision postulates 
the tribe as a viable source and advocate of communal rights 
and power in relations with their "discovering" nations. 
That this appeal contains both a moral and political content, 
only serves to emphasize the needs for fair and just legal 
forums and principles in which to assert those appeals. 
70See Comment, "The Indian .Battle for Self-Determination," 58 CALIF. 
t. REV. 445 and see, R. BARSH and J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES 
AND POLITICAL HISTORY (1980). 
34 
Section IV 
The Implied Warranty of Habitability 
in the Nonfreehold Estate 
The Javins v. First National Realty corp.71 case held 
that a warranty of habitability is implied by operation of 
law into leases of urban dwelling units and that breach of 
this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of 
contract. The court held that "the tenant's obligation to 
pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his 
obligations, including his warranties to maintain the pre-
mises in habitable condition." 72 
During the past fifteen years, landlord-tenant law has 
undergone a transformation, in part because of the Javins 
holding. After Javins, many courts began to apply contract 
doctrine to the modern non-commercial leasehold estate and 
developed interesting variations on the Javins warranty 
theme. 73 The case has had a direct impact on the lives of 
America's poor and the Third World which inhabits our own 
nation. It has raised controversial questions wi thin the 
American legal community about the role of the court in our 
social, political, and economic life. 
Professor Kennedy has called Skelly Wright, the judge 
71428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1070) [here-
inafter cited as Javins]. 
72Id . at 1082. 
73Siege1, "Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance? ---- An 
Historical Inquiry." 52 J. URB. L. 649, 650, 668-670 (1975). 
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who wrote the maj ori ty opinion for the D. C . Circuit in 
Javins, "an important actor in a symbolic representation of 
the conflict of commitments.,,74 Judge Wright's Javins 
. . 11 h 75 1 f t " '11 op1n10n, as we as ot ers, are examp es 0 a cour W1 -
ing to treat judicial power as an autonomous creative factor 
in the development of economic and political life. In 
private law it (judicial activism) refers to the court's 
willingness to change or evolve the law in ways that upset 
existing patterns of economic and social advantage.,,76 
Judge Wright wrote: 
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal 
property law, that a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant 
an interest in land that may have been reasonable in a 
rural, agrarian society. . . But in the case of the modern 
apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives 
74 
"Form and Substance," supra note 5, at 1777. 
75See Williams v. Walker Furn,iture 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(hereinafter cited as Williams]. The court held that the contract 
between the buyer (a black welfare recipient) and the seller (a retail 
furniture store) was unconsQionable and, hence, unenforceable. Speaking 
for the majority of the cou~t, et pages 449-50, Judge Wright reasoned: 
(0] rdinarily, one who signs an agreement without full know-
ledge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he 
has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little 
bargaining power, and hence little r~al choice, signs a com-
mercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of 
its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an 
objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all 
the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of 
the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and 
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract 
are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld. 
(Judge Wright referred to RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 70 (1932) and to 63 
HARV. L. REV. 494 (1950) in the above discussion.) 
76 D. Kennedy, "Toward An Historical Understanding of Legal Conscious-
ness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought In America, 1850-1940," 3 
RESEARCH IN L. AND SOC. 3, 5-6 3 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Kennedy, 
"Legal Consciousness"). 
36 
_____ .... ____ .... _ ................... '-6.# .,.,....., ... ,,~ .&-IC1n UVVLU~n.LI 
him a place to li ve. . . When American city dwellers, both 
rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they seek a well known 
package of goods and seryices -- a package which includes not 
merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and 
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windo" 
and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance. . . 
After taking jUdicial notice of these realities in the 
urban tenement, Judge Wright rejected the old no-repair rule 
of traditional landlord-tenant law under which the lessoE is 
not obligated to repair unless he covenants to do so in the 
written lease contract. 7S He then drew from recent develop-
ments in contract law pertaining to the buyer of goods and 
services to conclude that an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity can coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord 
by a typical modern housing code. 79 His contention was that 
the landlord was in the better position to know about and to 
correct housing code violations. 
The "no repair rule" is merely an extension of the 
caveat emptor rule (i.e., "buyer beware"). Such rules show 
a bias toward individualistic values for several reasons. 
First, they encourage the landlord's "autonomy" because they 
place "restrictions on the (landlord's) obligations of 
sharing and sacrifice. and .oppose the broadening, 
intensifying and extension of (the landlord's) liability."SO 
It limits the extent to which one should have to share or to 
77J . aVl.ns, 428 F.2d at 1074. 
78Id . at 1076. 
79 See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 445. 
80"Form and Substance," supra note 5, at 1735. 
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agreement. Second, they suggest that "judges ought not to 
conceive of themselves as 'regulators' of the use of econo-
mic power . [judges should] conceive the legal system as 
a limited set of existing restraints imposed on the state of 
nature, and then refus[e] to extend those restraints to new 
situations."81 In other words, such rules "facilitate" the 
landlord's use of his bargaining power as the determinant of 
the desired outcome in the landlord-tenant arrangement. 
Finally, such rules reinforce the landlord's and tenant's 
"self-determination": lithe parties themselves are the best 
and only legitimate judges of their own interests ... and 
should be allowed to behave foolishly, do themselves harm, 
and otherwise refuse to accept any other person's view of 
what is best for them. 1I82 
The Javins implied warranty of habitability attempts to 
bring greater parity to the landlord-tenant relationship, 
one that has traditionally been marked by the tenant's 
unequal bargaining position. When the implied warranty is 
contrasted with the no-repair rule, it is more altruistic in 
nature. First, it is II communi tyll-oriented because it re-
sponds to the question of lithe extent to which one should 
have to share or make sacrifices in the interest of another 
in the absence of agreement II by expanding the network of the 
landlord's liability.83 Second, it "regulates" the bargain-
81 Id . at 1736. 
82 Id . at 1737. 
83Id . at 173"3-35. 
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ing relationship by taking the position that the regulation 
IIrepresents an attempt to achieve distributive justice which 
the judges should forward rather than impede. 11 84 Finally, 
it is IIpaternalistic ll in its stance on the question of 
whether or not the parties are the best judges of their own 
interests. Because the parties are not perceived as the 
best judge of their interests in each and every case, the 
paternalistic policy underlying the implied warranty of 
habitability holds itself out as being as Illegitimate as 
(the policy) of self-determination and should be extended as 
circumstances permit or require. 1I8S 
The net effect of the implied warranty of habitability 
rule is that the landlord's margin of profit is reduced in 
order to ensure that the rental unit comports with the 
municipality's housing codes. There is little data to 
indicate whether landlords affected by a Javins-type war-
ranty of habitability make the necessary repairs and thereby 
lose some of their profit. Because many landlords are 
entrepreneurs whose goal it is to maximize profits, recent 
trends suggest that when the margin of profit is reduced to 
an unsatisfactory point, many landlords opt to get out of 
the rental housing market by converting to condominium 
ownership,86 setting fires in order to receive insurance 
84Id . at 1736. 
85Id . at 1737. 
86See generally c. HAAR and L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW at 216-313 
(1977) . 
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proceeds87 or simply by reinvesting in other ventures. 88 
More significantly I while many courts have developed 
interesting variations on the Javins warranty theme I other 
courts have limited the application of the implied warranty 
rule. 89 Judge Wright's attempt to impose values of sharing 
87There is little data to support the proposition that numerous 
landlords have indeed set fires to urban tenements and order to receive 
insurance proceeds. However, the popular wisdom in places like Boston, 
New York City and Washington, D.C. is that whenever an urban tenement 
becomes decisively unprofitable, owners have the option to make money be 
setting fire to the dwelling. During the last ten years, fire of suspi-
cious origin in places like Dorchester, and Lynn, Massachusetts, New 
York City, and Washington, D.C., have given some credence to this popu-
lar wisdom. 
88See generally, G. STERNL1EB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD (1966). 
89The following are interesting variations on the Javins implied 
warranty of habitability: 
1. Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189, 293 
N.E.2d 831, 843 (19 3): 
[T]his means that at the inception of the rental there 
are no latent or patent defects in facilities vital to 
the use of the premises for residential purposes and that 
these essential facilities will remain during the entire 
term in a condition which makes the property livable. 
2. Minn. Stat. Ann. §504.18(1)(Supp. 1975-1976): 
[1]n every lease or license of residential premises, whe-
ther in writing or parol, the lessor or licensor covenants: 
(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit 
for the use intended by the parties. 
(b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during 
the term of the lease or license, except when the disre-
pair has been caused by th ewillful, malicious, or 
irresponsible conduct of lhe lessee or licensee or a 
person under his direction or control. 
(c) To maintain the pn'mist's in compliance with the 
applicable health and sa rely laws of the state and of 
the local units of governmt'nt where the premises are 
located during the term of the lease or license, except 
when violation of the health and safety laws has been 
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add sacrifice into an area of the law traditionally noted 
for its harsh, individualistic stance, demonstrates the 
difficulty in breaking through the barriers of previously 
unchallenged assumptions. That there would be resistance is 
not surprise. That. there should be only an imperceptible 
change in the basic relations between the poor and wealthy 
as a result of Javins should only urge us to complete the 
breakthrough which Javins first accomplished, thereby creat-
ing a more just vision of the rights of those Third World 
peoples within our own borders. 
(footnote 89 continued) 
caused by the willful, malicious, or irresponsible 
conduct of the lessee or licensee ora person under 
his direction or control. 
The parties to a lease or license of residen-
tial premises may not wai·ve or modify the covenants 
imposed by this section. 
3. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa, 1972): 
[U]nder these circumstances we hold the landlord 
impliedly warrants at the outset of the lease that there 
are no latent defects in facilities and utilities vital 
to the use of the premises for residential purposes and 
that these essential features shall remain during the 
entire term in such condition to maintain the habitabil-
ity of the dwelling. Further, the implied warranty we 
perceive in the lease situation is a representation there 
neither is nor shall be during the term a violation of 
applicable housing law, ordinance or regulation which 
shall render the premises unsafe, or unsanitary and unfit 
for living therein. 
Compare the above judicial and legislative developments with the 
following post-Javins developments: 
1. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L. Ed. 
2d 36 (The Supreme Court upheld the eviction procedures of the 
state of Oregon which gave tenants six days from the filing of 
landlord's eviction proceeding to prepare a response or a 
defense). 
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Section V 
Conclusion 
The term "third world, II overinclusive and nebulous, 
displays an almost invidious attempt to delegi timate and 
aggregate the diffuse claims and problems of third world 
peoples and cultures in their relations to liberal govern-
ments within the western world. Third world legal issues 
pose tremendous conflicts for international tribunals, 
treaty-making bodies, and American courts. The Kennedy 
liberalist construct helps us understand that third world 
(footnote 89 continued) 
2. Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 239, § 8A: 
Whenever any counterclaim or claim of defense under 
this section is based. on any allegation concerning the 
condition of the premises or the services or equipment 
provided therein, the tenant or occupant shall not be 
entitled to relief under the section unless: (1) the 
owner or his agents, servants, or employees, or the 
person to whom the tenant or occupant customarily paid 
his rent knew of such conditions before the tenant or 
occupant was in arrears in his rent; (2) the plaintiff 
does not show that such conditions were caused by the 
tenant or occupant or any other person acting under his 
control; except that the defendant shall have the burden 
of proving that any violation appearing soley within that 
portion of the premises under his control and not by its 
nature reasonably attributable to any action or failure 
to act of the plaintiff was no so caused; (3) the pre-
mises are not situated in a holdet or motel, nor in a 
lodgining house or rooming house where the occupant has 
maintained such occupancy for less than three consecutive 
months; and (4) the plaintiff does not show that the 
conditions complained of cannot be remedied without the 
premises· being vacated. 
A careful reading of the Oregon statute referred to in Lindsey and 
the above excerpt from the Massachusetts General Laws suggests that an 
uneducated or unwary tenant could easily get caught in the cracks of 
unknown or complicated procedures, and thus never receive the benefit of 
the Javins ruling. 
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issues do indeed reflect the different substantive and 
formal modes jurists adopt in disposing of law disputes 
which ultimately deal with how a particular aspect of life 
should be allocated or reallocated. As in non-third world 
contexts, a critical examination of third world legal issues 
shows how divided we are between irreconcilable visions of 
humanity and society and between radically different aspira-
tions for our common future. 
In the law of the sea context, where the controversy 
focuses on the allocation of seabed minerals, the conflict-
ing visions are reflected by the industrialized nations' 
advancement of a res nullius legal status for deep sea 
minerals and the third world nation's insistence of the res 
communes legal status. The former is individualistic in 
nature and would lead to clearly defined administrable 
rules. 90 The latter is more altruistic in nature, and would 
lead to a redistributive regulatory scheme which would 
produce ad hoc results which are of little precedential 
value. 9l The choice between the two cannot be obscured by 
the recitation of value-laden legal discourse. The choice 
is political and an expression of how we feel life on this 
globe should be lived. 
In the Indian resource development and control context 
in Western nation-states, including America, the highly 
individualistic Doctrine of Discovery provides the concep-
90"Form and Substance," supra note 5, at 1685. 
91 ld . 
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tual backdrop for the modern Anglo-Indian relationship. It 
also serves to relegate the tribal concept to a juristic and 
poli tical anomaly wi thin the American legal culture. This 
Doctrine contrasts with a more altruistic concept in which 
tribal sovereignty becomes a legitimate mode of expression 
for Indian rights. Again though, this vision will only gain 
credence within Western liberal theory by radically restruc-
turing the framework upon which we have traditionally deci-
ded Indian rights questions. 
political, and not legal. 
Such a choice is inherently 
Finally, in the landlord-tenant context, a warranty of 
habitability has been implied in the lease of urban dwellers, 
who make up America's own third world community. This 
implied warranty attempts to ensure that urban dwellers will 
receive an apartment which complies with local health and 
safety codes. It posits a more altruistic vision for the 
urban dweller than the individualist-inspired vision impli-
ci t in the no-repair rule, which essentially maximizes the 
landlord's profit marg~n. In Javins, Judge Wright sought to 
reallocate the landlord's and tenant's "bundle of sticks." 
Specifically, the implied warranty notion took one of the 
landlord's profit sticks and gave it to the tenant in the 
form of a "more habitable" rental unit. 
A critical approach to liberal theory, then, as this 
paper has attempted to demonstrate, does provide a good 
starting point for the discussion of third world legal 
issues. A critical approach helps us to understand the 
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competing political and ideological interests and arguments 
on both sides of the adversarial line. It also suggests 
that third world legal issues squarely confront the funda-
mental contradiction wi thin modern legal thought, namely, 
that the world of others is both necessary to and incom-
patible with our freedom. As suggested by the interdepen-
dence theme of former UN Ambassador, Donald McHenry, 92 the 
industrialized world and the developing third world are more 
economically and socially interdependent than any other time 
in modern history. However, the interests of each tend to 
modify, curtail, or cancel the interests of the other. 
Consequently, we see 'that third world legal issues can, 
like so many other issues in liberal legal discourse, be 
"reduced to the degree of collective as opposed to indivi-
dual self-determination that is appropriate. ,,93 In the 
third world context, "collective self-determination" is a 
euphemism for altruistic approaches to third world problems 
wherein others (e.g. private citizens, businesses, or indus-
trialized nation-states) are expected to share their re-
sources with aggrieved third world persons or nations in 
order to advance, inter alia, what has been coined, the New 
International Economic Order. 94 On the other hand, the 
familiar phrase "individual self-determination" is just 
92D. McHenry, "The Fole of Interdependence In United States Foreign 
Policy Toward The Third World," 2 B.C. THIRLD WORLD L.J. 29 (1981). 
93"The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries," supra note 5, at 213. 
94See "Toward A Definition of the Term Third World," supra note 10, 
at 18-21. 
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another euphemism for individualistic approaches to third 
world problems wherein the interests of others should not be 
subordinated to the interests of aggrieved third world 
persons or nations. 
ilLiberalism, however, provides no method for deciding 
how any particular feature of life should be allocated among 
its competing dualities. 11 95 But, only by a criti"cal ap-
proach to liberal theory and discourse are we able to disco-
ver how we, as jurists, do allocate some particular feature 
of life which ultimately turns on our own vision of the role 
of the jurist (lawyer, court, international tribunal or 
treaty-making body) in the global society. 
We may be "collective self-determinists" believing that 
we should treat judicial power lias an autonomous creative 
factor in the development of economic and political life."96 
Or we may be "individual self-determinists,1I believing that 
"judges should not conceive of themselves as regulators of 
the use of economic power. 11 97 In either case, our choice as 
to a vision of laws' place in ordering our political and 
economic life is simply that, a choice amongst visions of 
how we as humans should live in the world. The outcomes are 
95 See Frug, supra note 1, at 1075. 
96 Kennedy, "Legal Consciousness," supra note 76, at 5. 
97 See "Form and Substance," supra note -S, at 1736. See also, the 
stated judicial philosophy of Supreme Court Justice, Sandra O'Connell: 
"[I] know well the difference between a legislator and a judge, and the 
role of the judge is to interpret the law, not make it. I do not be-
lieve it is the function of the judiciary to step in and change the law 
because times have changed or because social mores have changed .... " 
Time Magazine, September 21, 1981, at 12. 
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by no means predetermined. Recognizing the choice makes it 
impossible to accept that the relations between the com-
forted and comfortless of our world are the result of immut-
able laws of reason and science. 
western liberal theory fails to provide a just frame-
work in considering the claims of third world groups by 
refusing to integrate and recognize the Third World's altru-
istic appeals into legal discourse regarding claims and 
rights. Like the Indian tribe, third world concepts like 
"res communes," "implied warranty of habi tabili ty" or "fair 
share,,98 become little more than juristic anomalies, incap-
able of precise understanding and therefore, dismissed as 
without value or concrete meaning. Consequently, the liber-
alist vision ultimately leads to little more than a reitera-
tion, rather than a resolution, of the fundamental contra-
diction. It thereby legitimates the results of concrete 
power struggles amongst peoples of the world as inevitable 
and therefore just. 
Our examination of the ideological presuppositions 
.98See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel 67 
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 
(19 7 5) . 
The court held that the wealthy suburban community had to meet its 
"fair share" of Camden County's housing needs by building 500 apartment 
units for low and moderate income families by the year 2000. The Mt. 
Laurel holding began a debate within New Jersey's political and legal 
circles that remains heated to this day. The attorney who filed the 
original Mt. Laurel suit, Carl Bisgaier, filed similar suits in New 
Jersey in his capacity as the Director of the Public Interest Advocacy 
Division of the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate (The De-
partment). As a result of the election of Governor Kern in November of 
1981, the future of the Department is questionable. 
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within liberal discourse has demonstrated that third world 
groups can only assert their vision of a just world order by 
challenging the very foundations of liberal legal thought. 
The assertion of a new vision opposed to the traditional, 
individualistically-oriented approach to third world prob-
lems is needed. This paper has attempted to begin the 
construction of the framework for such a vision. It is 
admi ttedly a tentative and wholly incomplete first step. 
But it is a step made from the conviction, that marginality 
and confusion are inevitable in the quest for human freedom. 
Such a quest is far more noble than adopting the smug atti-
tude of complacency which attends the circular arguments 
used to deny the injustice which is everywhere present in 
our world. 
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